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8 Abstract Olaf Mu¨ller’s book (More Light) develops a new case for underdetermination
9 (prismatic equivalence), and, as he is focusing on theories of a ‘limited domain’, this
10 assumes the containability of the theories. First, the paper argues that Mu¨ller’s theory of
11 darkness is fundamentally Newtonian, but for Newton’s optical theory the type of theo-
12 retical structure Mu¨ller adopts is problematic. Second, the paper discusses seventeenth-
13 century challenges to Newton (by Huygens and Lucas), changes in the proof-structure of
14 Newton’s optical theory, and how these affect Mu¨ller’s reconstruction. Mu¨ller’s book
15 provides empirically equivalent theories, yet the historical theories were not empirically
16 equivalent, and the same experiments were used to extract different bodies of evidence to
17 rebut the opponent. Third, Goethe’s multi-layered critique of Newton’s experimental proof
18 is investigated, including his developmental account of prismatic colours, the role of
19 experimental series in rejecting Newton’s observations, and his incorporation of the
20 ‘limited domain’ of prismatic colours in a broader framework. Two key elements of
21 Goethe’s method, polarity and strengthening are discussed in contrast to Mu¨ller, who only
22 utilises polarity in his account. Finally Neurath’s attempts to come to grips with the optical
23 controversies and the prism-experiments with ‘blurred edges’ are recalled. Mu¨ller also
24 discusses in detail some of these experiments and heavily draws on Quine. Neurath
25 developed Duhem’s and Poincare´’s conventionalist insights and had good reasons to be
26 pessimistic about theory-containment. Their differences provide some additions to the
27 history of the Duhem–Quine thesis.
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34 Olaf Mu¨ller’s voluminous inverted spectrum thought experiment utilises aspects of both
35 Newton’s and Goethe’s views, connecting problems of underdetermination and theory-
36 appraisal with detailed studies of historical theories (Mu¨ller 2015). In Newton’s first sci-
37 entific paper traditional spectra were used to argue for the existence of heterogeneous rays
38 in white light. Mu¨ller uses inverted, unorthodox spectra—first discussed in detail in
39 Goethe’s Beitra¨ge zur Optik—to argue for the possibility of constructing a theory operating
40 with heterogeneous rays of darkness. The mapping of the spectra in complementary set-
41 tings develops the argument from visual demonstration, some real experiments. And helps
42 Mu¨ller to argue for a new case of underdetermination, prismatic equivalence, and to
43 construct a theory of the heterogeneity of darkness (Mu¨ller 2016).
44 To pursue a critical dialogue with the book, the paper explicates philosophical stakes
45 and some facets of the reconstructed controversy. One stake is the aptness of Mu¨ller’s
46 approach to underdetermination by studying theories of a ‘limited domain’, another is the
47 plausibility of Mu¨ller’s view of theories that instructs his reconstructive methodology.
48 Both stakes concern containment, starting with the first: can one, as Mu¨ller suggests,
49 clearly delimit the domain in an attempt to provide a strong reading, and restrict the
50 enterprise to a ‘‘smaller theory (Optics)’’ (p. 349)? Mu¨ller’s book reads at times as if
51 ‘optics’ pertained to prism-experiments, the scope of the early publications of the pro-
52 tagonists, Newton’s New Theory (Newton 1671-72) and Goethe’s Beitra¨ge zur Optik (LA
53 I:3), yet it promises the reader a strong reconstruction of the position. The gifted Newton
54 worked over 30 years to republish his theory, comparable to the time Goethe devoted to the
55 subject from the first Beitra¨ge to the Farbenlehre, and his work with entoptic colours.
56 In their development their theories incorporated and subordinated other domains (e.g.
57 Newton’s nomograph of the coloured rings discovered by Hooke, or Goethe’s polarity
58 scheme extended to the Archetypal Phenomenon), and these developments were informed
59 by the broader research agendas of the protagonists with the aim of strengthening their
60 theoretical positions. Leaving much of Newton’s Opticks and Goethe’s Farbenlehre out of
61 the reconstruction assumes that the extensive nature of the research agendas have no
62 bearing on how strongly the positions concerning the earlier, ‘limited domain’ are
63 supported.
64 The other containment issue is whether Mu¨ller’s framework can handle the complexity
65 of these theories. In times when it is much debated what kind of objects theories should be
66 (Halvorson 2012), Mu¨ller promises to shed more light on some of the long-debated topics
67 surrounding both Newton’s—at first highly—controversial optical theory, and the polar-
68 ised reception of one of Goethe’s top scientific achievements, his Farbenlehre. The book’s
69 subtitle (‘‘Goethe mit Newton im Streit um die Farben’’) alludes to the polarization of
70 views concerning light and colour, and Mu¨ller exploits many strands of the rich histori-
71 ography on his Quinean quest, but can the assumed two-language game, where on the one
72 hand we have sense data (phenomena) and on the other theoretical acts (propositions)
73 contain enough of the controversy, to vindicate Mu¨ller’s claim, that the book contributes to
74 the philosophy of colour-experimentation (§I.3.12, p. 81)?
75 The aim of my appraisal is to scrutinise Mu¨ller’s reconstructive tools utilised to develop
76 a philosophical argument using a case study. Through my chronologically structured
77 comments I shall focus on specific challenges to and interpretations of Newton’s theory
78 from different centuries, revolving around common themes: (1) scope of the proof for
79 Newton’s theory, (2) scope of the critiques for Newton’s theory.
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80 Section 2 discusses two points raised by contemporary critics. The first is by Huygens,
81 addressing the problem of extending Newton’s demonstration using the Sun’s rays to white
82 light, and how this affects Mu¨ller’s reconstruction. The second is by Lucas, describing
83 subjective prismatic experiments, probably the forerunner to some of the most sophisti-
84 cated contemporary inverted spectrum experiments, employing reflective aperture dia-
85 phragms. Via analysing experimental descriptions of Newton, Lucas, and later of Goethe
86 and Young I shall outline some of the sense-data stakes in the controversy and show that
87 the theoretical alternatives to Newton (utilising different explanatory frameworks) inter-
88 preted the data differently. Data-handling issues suggest that the controversy was not
89 settled on the empirical level.
90 Section 3 is devoted to specific aspects of Goethe’s colour-theory, and investigates the
91 picture provided by Mu¨ller on Goethe’s methodology. To fit his view on theories (inherited
92 mostly from Quine) Mu¨ller highlights polarities but downplays the fundamentally devel-
93 opmental perspective that connects Goethe’s research on plants, colours, and science. As
94 opposed to Newton’s refraction of a beam of light and no interaction Goethe not only
95 discusses refractions at the two edges of a form but also studies the interaction. I shall
96 discuss his critique of Newton’s observations in early sections of the Opticks, as well as his
97 experimental series and his study of birefringence.
98 Newton’s optical theory became textbook knowledge hundreds of years ago, yet we still
99 have no uncontroversial account of what exactly the theory was, or how it was proved.
100 How one should do rational reconstruction of the theory utilising Goethe’s critique and
101 insight is not a trivial question. Newton’s optical theory and the evidential base cannot be
102 easily reduced to equations, formulas, or propositions.
103 Neurath might have been the first to recognise this, so Sect. 4 is devoted to him. As the
104 birth and development of HPS as a discipline were closely tied to the historiography of
105 Newton’s methodology, to appreciate Mu¨ller’s project it is instructive to recall Neurath’s
106 attempts to come to grips with the optical controversies. On the one hand, the two are
107 remarkably similar, connecting the Newton–Goethe controversy with the problem of
108 underdetermination. Both put significant weight on some of the same prism-experiments
109 with ‘blurred edges’, to be discussed below in detail. As Mu¨ller builds on Quine, Neurath
110 develops Duhem’s and Poincare´’s conventionalist insights. On the other hand, Mu¨ller
111 seems sanguine that his project is doable, and, in fact, he has actually done it. Neurath,
112 however, tried to provide a more refined mapping of the group of optical theories, but
113 while he worked on the project, he came up within a year with various, partly overlapping
114 but partly contradictory categorisations (Neurath 1914/5, 1915).1 He saw enough of the
115 controversy to be pessimistic about containment:
116 We see that the mere enumeration of elementary notions is not yet sufficient to place
117 a system of hypotheses historically. One should also always indicate which facts
118 have been neglected, which favoured. The systems of hypotheses of physics, like all
119 other systems of hypotheses, are an instruction directing not only the connectedness,
120 but also the selection of facts. Each system of hypotheses, even if its formulations are
121 of the utmost precision, has, to use this expression, a blurred margin. This always and
122 necessarily exists. The amount of difficulties can grow through new insight; at best
123 we can approach clarity asymptotically. A complete mastery of the whole multi-
124 plicity seems an impossibility to us. (Neurath 1983: 23–24).
125
1FL01 1 This research partly overlapped with his work on ‘the auxiliary motive’ and ‘pseudorationalism’, see also
1FL02 the last section of (Biddle 2013).
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126 Mu¨ller’s book provides empirically equivalent theories with the kind of deductive proof
127 that characterizes most philosophical debates on underdetermination, but the historical
128 theories were not empirically equivalent, and although both were reasonably well con-
129 firmed, they differed on the inductive methods for determining beliefs. Far from being a
130 good example for alternative theories making the identical empirical predictions, the same
131 experiments were used to extract different bodies of evidence to rebut the alternative on the
132 empirical level. Neurath used the example a century ago to illustrate that both ‘theory’ and
133 ‘data’ are fallible.
134 2 Seventeenth-Century Alternatives to Newton: Huygens and Lucas
135 In his carefully crafted if somewhat overdramatised account of the controversy-con-
136 glomerate, Mu¨ller assumes that Newton’s (or Goethe’s) theory is a more or less easily
137 delineable entity. From his perspective the time was not ripe for Newton’s theory when it
138 was first published (p. 387), disregarding the possibility that the theory was not ripe at that
139 time, and that the evidence-base or the presentational devices needed improvement. Below
140 I shall outline only two of the many early critical objections that Newton received, and
141 show how the glitches noted over 300 years ago by Huygens and Lucas affect the prov-
142 ability of Mu¨ller’s alternative theory. I believe that both criticisms contributed to a stronger
143 formulation of the evidential base of Newton’s theory, they changed the way he presented
144 the theory, and also changed the structure of the proof of the theory, influencing what the
145 ‘limited domain’ is, and how it could be proved as being embedded in a more complex
146 theory.
147 2.1 Two Types of Sources of White Light: Huygens
148 Oldenburg sent a copy of the ‘‘New Theory’’ to Christiaan Huygens, accompanied by a
149 note that drew attention to Newton’s work. About the theory of colours Huygens’s first
150 reaction (‘‘elle me paroit fort ingenieuse’’) was positive (Turnbull 1959: 135). In the
151 following letter his opinion was again favourable, but with some reservations. And in his
152 third letter (27 September) he picked up a line of argument from Hooke,2 and discussed a
153 surprising idea confirmed in the nineteenth century by Helmholtz: white might be com-
154 posed of only yellow and blue, that is, mixing spectral yellow and blue can result in white
155 (with theatrical lighting and filters we get ‘light gray’, see Holtsmark 2012: 17). Newton in
156 his reply was not amicable (3 April, 1673):
157 If therefore M Huygens would conclude any thing, he must show how white may be
158 produced out of two uncompounded colours; wch when he hath done, I will further
159 tell him, why he can conclude nothing from that (Turnbull 1959: 265).
160 From Newton’s perspective the white composed of yellow and blue would have different
161 physical properties, would not be the same white as the sun’s white, cold not ‘‘be truly
162 called white’’ (Turnbull 1959: 265). Huygens retorted:
2FL01 2 Both Hooke and Huygens used two colours (explananda) to account for colours, as opposed to Newton’s
2FL02 indefinite number of colours. These modificationist accounts belonged to the class of theories that Newton
2FL03 rejected in his New Theory, the basic colours were different, but the two-colour hypothesis was supported by
2FL04 parsimony. Huygens pointed out the simplicity of a mechanical model operating with only two colours, and
2FL05 stated that Newton’s theory could be a very plausible hypothesis (Turnbull 1959: 235–236).
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163 I desire to know his meaning when he adds that though I should prove that white may
164 be made of only two primitive colours, yet it concludes nothing against him, & yet he
165 says p. 3083 of the transactions that all the primitive colours are necessary to the
166 composing of white. (Turnbull 1959: 286)
167 Newton’s impatient and slightly arrogant answer on 23 June 1673 ended the correspon-
168 dence of the two (at the time probably greatest) writers on the topic. Huygens’s comment
169 put Newton on defence, some propositions of the New Theory had to be modified
170 (influencing proposition 1., 2., 3., 5., 7., 8). Newton had to (and did) restrict his claims to
171 the white light of the sun, greatly reducing the universal nature of his theory. As Shapiro
172 convincingly argues, this ‘‘embarrassing dichotomy’’ diminished the power of appealing to
173 similarity or analogy, like one of the two (independent) arguments presented in the
174 Lectiones (Shapiro 1980: 225). Huygens pointed out that the proof structure of Newton’s
175 theory needs to specify the source, and cannot just go with a phenomenological category
176 ‘white’.3
177 Part I of Mu¨ller’s book dutifully acknowledges this limitation: ending the chain of
178 argumentation, he states: ‘‘(R) White Sunlight is a heterogeneous mixture of diversely
179 refrangible light rays.’’ [§I.5.10., p. 110, also (REC), §IV.I.5., p. 319]. The argument
180 developed in Part II, however, leaves the source out of the question: ‘‘Goethe … searched
181 for a bipolar Theory in which light and darkness play an equally legitimate causal role.
182 This much searched for middle way he did not find’’ (p. 144). I shall return to the
183 evaluative remark in the next section, and here only want to note that the question of the
184 source of rays is gradually dropped in Mu¨ller’s book. By the time we reach the equivalence
185 table of the phenomenological concepts mapping the orthodox and unorthodox crucial
186 experiments, only lightness and darkness and white light and black shadow are charted (p.
187 203).
188 The Sun is not a part of Mu¨ller’s ‘orthodox’ description of Newton’s experiment, a
189 rather unorthodox solution to Huygens’ challenge. Mu¨ller urges physicists to consider the
190 (counter)intuitive conversion to an inverse corpuscular theory, but his rays of darkness are
191 created ex nihilo in the philosopher’s conceptual lab. For the cogency of the proof, Newton
192 was forced to disambiguate the source of white. Could two types of darkness sources
193 (corresponding to Newton’s and Huygens’s/Helmholtz’s white) be meaningfully distin-
194 guished before refraction in Mu¨ller’s theory by specifying two types of conditions?
195 2.2 Two Coloured Fringes of Equal Length: Lucas
196 The first inverted experiment in Mu¨ller’s reconstruction comes from the most ardent Jesuit
197 opponent of Newton (§II.3.16, p. 163). In one of his subjective prismatic experiments,
198 Lucas cut out black and white circles, and placed them on white and black background.
199 Viewing them from 16 feet, he found that ‘‘the yellow in the inferior limbus of the black
200 circle fully equalld in length ye violet of the white one, even whilst the spectrum of the
201 white circle was represented at its greatest Length.’’ Also, ‘‘the red of the superior limbus
3FL01 3 There are many subtle shifts in position, opponents cornered Newton after his early exposition of the
3FL02 optical theory. Mu¨ller’s rays are ‘strongly immutable’ (they exist before the first refraction), and he assumes
3FL03 a Naturkonstant. Newton’s argument in extending the reasoning from the second prism to the first in the
3FL04 crucial experiment also employs a principle of economy—a notion used in optics at least since the
3FL05 Catoptrics of Hero of Alexandria (Cohen and Drabkin 1948 (1969))—but this has been challenged in the
3FL06 controversy, and helped Newton restructure his proof (no experiment is called crucial in the Opticks). Mu¨ller
3FL07 notes that he is probably the only one who thinks Newton’s theory follows from the crucial experiment
3FL08 (§I.5.17, 117).
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202 of ye white circle equalled in length the violet, or rather blew of the black one’’. This
203 demonstrates that ‘‘very different colours, yea quite opposit ones may at the same inci-
204 dence appeare under the selfe same degree of refraction’’ (Turnbull 1960: 106–107).
205 If Newton dismisses this critique (as, for the first case the colour yellow does not
206 originate in the black region or the boundary, but from light around the circle) could Mu¨ller
207 not dismiss the critique? Well-acquainted with scholastic concepts and modificationist
208 colour theories (Descartes, Hooke, Huygens, Lucas), Newton took the objection seriously.
209 The description hinted at an alternative to Newton’s theoretical understanding of refrac-
210 tion.4 Contrary to Newton’s New Theory, the later published Opticks started the investi-
211 gation with subjective experiments and image displacement (Book I Part I Prop. 1. Exp.
212 1–2), and not with light from the Sun. Very specific colours were used to rebut the
213 alternative, to be discussed in the next section.
214 Many readers appreciate the complexity of the move from a venerable mixed mathe-
215 matical science, an atemporal world of geometrical mapping relations, to modern optics as
216 a part of physics, where for centuries ontological stakes were high (is light a particle, a
217 wave, or both, or none), with significant impact on the emerging popular understanding of
218 science.
219 Modificationist theories, when dealing with the problem of the elongation of the
220 spectrum could separate the chromatic problem and the geometric problem, and both Lucas
221 and Goethe discussed refraction without the appearance of colour (Turnbull 1960: 250;
222 Goethe 1988, Farbenlehre Didaktischer Teil (FL-DT) §195–196). Newton, in contrast,
223 proposed a solution where the law of sines, a major discovery of the seventeenth century
224 could be saved in a modified form by connecting the geometric and the chromatic problem.
225 Mu¨ller is nonchalant regarding modification-theories (p. 87), and minimises the burden
226 of proof in both the reconstruction (the Optical Lectures is too complex to present, §I.2.14,
227 p. 64), and in the explication (on his thought experiment on unordinary spectra (pp.
228 289–290). Lucas’s critique shows how a modificationist framework can be used to exploit
229 the circular features of Newton’s theory, and has some similarities with Goethe’s treatment
230 of black and white on a par. Both draw attention to the equal extension of (pairs of)
231 coloured fringes of the displaced image.5 At stake is whether we think of the camera
232 obscura as a tool in which the outside world, including the Sun is mapped, or a setup,
233 where rays suffer refraction to yield a spectrum. The early part of the imagery of the
234 Opticks conformed to the tradition, but later plates introduced parallel bundles, sometimes
235 even inside a camera obscura (Zemple´n 2017a), at odds with the tradition of mapping
236 angular sizes.
237 Newton’s ray-concept was intricately tied to a corpuscular assumption, and so is
238 Mu¨ller’s alternative theory to Newton’s. As Torger Holtsmark noted, with his definition of
239 ray Newton ‘‘took an important step away from the old established geometrical image
4FL01 4 Before Newton, the coloured fringes were connected to the ‘‘ancient theory of the nature of the rainbow’s
4FL02 colors, a theory which held that a succession of modifications of sunlight by the droplets of a rain cloud
4FL03 produced the colors of the bow’’. In mechanical hypotheses, it was generally ‘‘a minor perturbation
4FL04 restricted primarily to the edges of the homogeneous beam of sunlight’’. The mixture of light and shade ‘‘at
4FL05 the region of contact between the refracted beam and the dark’’ is a result of ‘‘varying ‘condensation’ and
4FL06 ‘rarefaction’ produced at the edges of the beam’’, or it might emerge ‘‘by some other mechanical modifi-
4FL07 cation’’ (Kuhn 1958: 30–31).
5FL01 5 Goethe describes the ways in which light interacts with darkness, white with black to show that ‘‘without a
5FL02 boundary […] no colors appear. That is, the boundary condition is fundamental’’ (Sepper 1988, p. 222). As
5FL03 Jonathan Westphal notes, ‘‘the crucial claim made by Goethe, which is at the centre of his polemic against
5FL04 Newton, [is] that (as we would say) colour is an edge-phenomenon’’ (Westphal 1987: 9).
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240 optics into physical optics. At the same time he introduced the above mentioned termi-
241 nological confusion, namely by applying the operational rules of the old image optics upon
242 a reinterpreted ray concept’’ (Holtsmark 2012: 39). Can darkness-rays be refracted without
243 colour in Mu¨ller’s theory? As Mu¨ller is definitely putting more weight on Newton’s
244 shoulder than Goethe, to me a naturally occurring query is whether he thinks that two
245 meaningful inverted theories are also constructible based on the (atemporal) image-map-
246 ping tradition, the contemporary alternative to Newton.
247 Interestingly, Newton’s theory developed in stages, and some early drafts contained
248 what Mu¨ller takes to be partly Goethe’s and partly his novel, post-Newtonian and critical
249 insight. In the Optica, Part II, Lecture 1 Newton still uses a broad modificationist
250 framework, as opposed to his rejection of the whole tradition in the New Theory:
251 I find that the modification of light whereby colours originate is connate to light and
252 arises neither from reflection nor from refraction, nor from the qualities or any modes
253 whatsoever of bodies, and it cannot be destroyed or changed in any way by them.
254 (Newton 1984, pp. 436–437)
255 Of course ‘connate’ modification is not much of a modificationist theory, but in this
256 manuscript of the Optical Lectures, Newton still did not distance himself from treating
257 white and black on a par, as he states: ‘‘I find that the colours white and black, together
258 with intermediate ashens or grays, are made by rays of every sort, confusedly mixed’’ (pp.
259 436–437). In the New Theory this is only stated for white (Prop. 7., challenged by
260 Huygens).
261 3 Goethe’s Theory-Building Practice
262 It seems that at times Goethe deliberately avoided the terminology of Newtonian optics, in
263 later writings the use of the word ‘‘Bild’’ (not uncommon among his contemporaries) as
264 opposed to ‘‘rays of light’’ makes his Farbenlehre (FL) rather difficult to translate (Bur-
265 wick 1989). The first proposition of Newton’s Opticks stated: ‘‘Lights which differ in
266 Colour, differ also in Degrees of Refrangibility’’, and Goethe took much care to note in the
267 polemical part (PT) that if different terminology is used, then the same phenomena could
268 be used to support other propositions, like: ‘‘images which differ in colour appear to be
269 displaced by refraction in various ways’’ (FL-PT §29). Newton’s description is unneces-
270 sarily theory laden, granting some form of heterogeneity of some supposed entities.6
271 Given the title of Mu¨ller’s book (More Light), I was surprised to see how little of
272 Goethe’s insight was utilised in the approach picked by the author. Goethe’s method is
273 unlike some hallmark eighteenth-century theories like Linne´’s, an early and pervasive
274 influence on Goethe, or Newton’s theory, later so vehemently criticised by him. Newton
275 used the Sun’s spectrum to argue for ‘sorts of Rays’, and Linne´’s classification labelled
276 similarities (definitio, genus) and differences (differentia, species). Both looked for
6FL01 6 This is what Mu¨ller at points attributes to Goethe, over-exploiting the source, and equivocating his non-
6FL02 modificationist alternative to Newton with Goethe’s views. In Mu¨ller’s early treatment Goethe would have
6FL03 rejected rays of darkness, his criticism of the ‘‘ray-concept’’ is discussed (§II.3.5 p. 152), after accrediting
6FL04 Goethe with thinking of the lack of light (Abwesenheit) as causal counter-idea (§II.3.3 p. 150), by the end of
6FL05 the book Goethe is accredited and praised for formulating the heterogeneity of darkness (‘‘der von ihm
6FL06 formulierten Heterogenita¨t des Finsternis’’ §4.7.7., p. 419). In his recent article Goethe’s dissolving,
6FL07 splitting, and scattering ‘‘black image’’ is praised as the idea that ‘‘darkness and blackness are composite
6FL08 phenomena’’ (LA I.7, 86, Mu¨ller 2016).
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277 discriminating traits (measurably different refrangibilities and differently coloured regions
278 of the spectrum; observable and countable natural referents like the number of pistils) and
279 gave intensional definitions of species (of light rays and of living forms).
280 The focal issue for Goethe was development, not classification or ascribing properties to
281 unobservables. His alternative (transformational) method did not rely fundamentally on the
282 species concept. The systematic studies of several domains might appear ascientific at first
283 glance, as they are minimising nomenclature, counting, and abstract entities, and are
284 capturing series via exposing links, directions and tensions.
285 To rediscover Goethe as a highly influential scientific thinker is not unusual for the
286 history of Goethe-reception in physics, and many have suspected mathematics behind his
287 approach. Heisenberg recognised a similarity between modern theories of symmetry and
288 number on the one hand, and Goethe’s elaboration of the morphology of colour phe-
289 nomena7 on the other. Several commentators agree that there are interestingly ‘formal’
290 aspects of Goethe’s science. Here we probably share the same ground with Mu¨ller. I think
291 one can go as far as Hegge in stating that
292 His aim is to arrive at a comparatively small number of simple, well-defined ele-
293 ments, corresponding to the axioms of geometry, that is, expressions which are not
294 further reducible to others, but express basic concepts in the system from which the
295 other elements are derived. (Hegge 1987: 202)
296 As has been noted by Goethe, his ‘superlative’ understanding of theory-construction is
297 based on two concepts, polarity and enhancement/progression (Steigerung).8 Mu¨ller
298 exploits the polarity-aspect, but brackets the enhancement-aspect, not appreciating one of
299 the most fundamental characteristics of Goethe’s approach. I shall therefore offer an
300 abbreviated reconstruction of Goethe’s alternative to model-building, utilising not just as
301 Mu¨ller does polarities, one of the cornerstones of his nature studies, but also investigating
302 the enhancement-advancement aspect (‘‘Steigerung’’) in his multi-layer critique of the
303 evidence base of Newton’s theory. First I shall address his developmental account of
304 prismatic colours (3.1) followed by a short discussion of his experimental series (3.2), and
305 his study of birefringence (3.3).
306 3.1 A Developmental Account of Colours
307 Goethe pursued the inner dynamics of the domains under investigation. A new domain
308 generally linked the domain to polarities already in use. Most explanatory terms create
309 geometrical or intermodal spaces. In his early work on plants ‘‘expansion–contraction’’,
310 which ‘‘would have to be manipulated as expertly as algebraic formulae, and would have to
311 be applied in the right places’’ (Mu¨ller 1989: 72, §102). In later botanical texts ‘vertical’
7FL01 7 Dennis Sepper adds that ‘‘One intriguing aspect of Goethe’s exposition of the phenomena is that it
7FL02 incorporates a fundamental concept of modern mathematics and mathematical physics, the limit of a series,
7FL03 potentially if not actually infinite. The superexperiment, whether continuously or discretely varied, allows
7FL04 one to approach phenomenally a limit that may not be reachable in fact - for instance, an aperture with the
7FL05 breadth of a mathematical point’’ (Sepper 1988, p. 75). Sepper also cites a manuscript, where Goethe derives
7FL06 straight-line boundaries from a curved boundary by performing what amounts to a continuous topological
7FL07 deformation of space to transform a circle to a line by changing viewing angles in subjective prismatic
7FL08 experiments (ibid. p. 76), and Ribe draws an analogy between Goethe’s modificationist model and differ-
7FL09 ential equations (Ribe 1985, p. 330).
8FL01 8 As the late Goethe criticises his own earlier work: ‘‘The composition lacks the consummating concept of
8FL02 two of Nature’s activating forces: polarity and progression’’ (Mu¨ller 1989, p. 245).
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312 and ‘spiral’ tendencies. And in the Beitra¨ge symmetrical coloured fringes, containing
313 thicker red and blue and thinner yellow and violet bands. The explanatory schemes have
314 shared features not just in plant morphology, but also regarding prismatic colours. Theories
315 of different domains display structural family-resemblance.
316 Goethe’s historically significant scientific achievements utilise polarity, but not only
317 polarity. In my view, a noteworthy feature of Goethe’s method is that where it was applied
318 with some success (comparative osteology, plant morphology, colour-studies), it always
319 utilised some pattern or progression (formation, transformation) in a phenomenal domain
320 to help differentiate conformity from deviation.9 Once an advancing series is located or
321 some ordering is achieved, one can develop a framework using polarities as explanatory
322 crutches, as reference points to help locate regularities as well as irregular forms. Goethe
323 used his observational and experimental series as a research tool in his exploratory research
324 (Ribe and Steinle 2002), and to establish the polarity and progression of the phenomenal
325 domain. It was also used in the rejection of the Newtonian experimental proof.
326 Let us first investigate the sense-data stakes of Goethe’s critique, and his description of
327 some subjective experiments, where polarity is apparent between warm and cool colours,
328 the two pairs of thinner and thicker coloured bands (the polarity aspect of the explanatory
329 structure). As we move away from the prism, make the strip thinner, or use a prism with
330 greater refractive angle, the coloured bands spread out. Goethe discusses the two refrac-
331 tions (at the edges of a form) and the interaction as opposed to Newton’s refraction of a
332 beam of light and no interaction. When the fringes meet, new colours appear, and the
333 enhancement aspect is just as crucial to Goethe’s account as is polarity. Enhancement in
334 bandwidth results in the overlapping of the two coloured bands, and a new polarity of
335 complementary colours emerges: green (visible in Newton’s spectrum) opposed to the
336 extra-spectral red (peach blossom/magenta) absent from Newton’s colour wheel.
337 A telling pictorial sign of the advancing, developmental features is that in Goethe’s
338 drawing of spectral colours, the interaction of edge-colours is a focal property of the
339 images (Coloured Tables 8–9 in Mu¨ller’s book). The new colours spread further, and
340 extinguish the two colours that gave birth to them: the yellow and the blue in the case of
341 the white strip, the violet and the red in the case of the black strip. Bracketing the
342 enhancement/advancement aspect is a lopsided interpretation of Goethe, who was an
343 ‘extreme partisan’ of the evolutionary idea, as Darwin referred to him. Goethe gave a
344 detailed description of what is also called the Bezold–Bru¨cke hue shift: at lower light
345 intensities we see more red and green, at higher light intensities the blues and yellows
346 dominate (Duck 1987). The colour-refrangibility correspondence wanes as matching a
347 unique hue with a binary hue is light-intensity dependent. As Michael Duck writes:
348 It is true that he [Goethe] displayed a certain obsessiveness about his theory of
349 colour, but that was, I contend, largely due to the sheer coincidence that the Bezold–
350 Bru¨cke phenomenon affects the appearance of the subjective spectrum in exactly the
351 way that his totally unrelated theory predicts. It was this extraordinarily fortuitous
352 fact that lead him to put a false interpretation upon what he saw. Since the phe-
353 nomenon was not consciously identified long after his death, he could hardly be
9FL01 9 Goethe’s observational method delimited the applicability of the toolset to specific domains. In botany, for
9FL02 example, he gave up on giving an account of the subterranean parts of plants. If no advancement can be
9FL03 traced, then his comparative method is not applicable. Given the scope of his method, this was an unjust
9FL04 demand (‘‘Unbillige Forderung’’): ‘‘it is advance solely that could attract me, hold me, and sweep me along
9FL05 my course’’ (Mu¨ller 1989: 118).
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354 blamed for thinking that what he saw through the prism bore out and confirmed his
355 theory (Duck 1987, p. 795).
356 There is a reduction of the spectra, not accounted for in Newton’s theory, and Mu¨ller
357 similarly leaves hue-shifts unaccounted for. Mu¨ller’s theorising about colours could be
358 called Antediluvian in many aspects10 and his model does not link to the colours we see
359 when we look at the experiment, only to abstract properties. His mapping game is static
360 (5–5 colours, CT 10–13) and uses Newton’s diagrammatic convention, as his rays of
361 darkness do not interact (CT 16–27), though a few snapshots acknowledge the effect (CT
362 30), without informing his theory. This approach neglects some of Goethe’s crucial
363 observations, presaging physiological insights into colour-vision, and is downplaying what
364 Goethe saw as well as how he explained what he saw.
365 I am less interested in the dynamics of hue-shifts and related phenomena than in how
366 Goethe’ enterprise provided a multi-layer critique of Newton’s theory. In the controversy,
367 the evidential base is not unaffected by the theoretical content, as experimental descrip-
368 tions are directed by the theoretical outlook. Mu¨ller notes the peculiar red/blue terminology
369 of the Opticks (§I.4.3, p. 93), but does not discuss the way colour-terminology is utilised in
370 the debate in detail. In the following I shall pick this as the red thread to show some of the
371 challenges to contain optical theories. A disagreement concerning the empirical details, the
372 description and interpretation of observations in the phenomenal domain Mu¨ller picked
373 (optics), quickly leads us to a methodological debate on picking protocols. The rival
374 theories differ on how they select and reconstitute facts, and in Sect. 4 these insight will be
375 used as an argument against the assumed containability of the optical theories in qestion.
376 3.2 Rejecting Empirical Proof with Experimental Series
377 In Newton’s experiment, possibly to rebut the type of challenge Lucas raised, a rectangular
378 piece of paper painted half blue, half red is viewed through a prism. Why would Newton
379 use blue instead of violet if the extremities of the spectrum are red and violet? There are
380 telling signs that Newton carefully picked certain ‘basic’ colours, and that colour-terms
381 played a role in how strong the empirical support for the theory (and Newton’s ray-
382 concept) was.11 Lucas writes about ‘‘scarlet’’ and ‘‘violet’’ colours (Turnbull 1960: 9). In
383 his reply Newton writes of ‘‘blew’’ and ‘‘red’’ (Turnbull 1960: 259).
384 In Goethe’s reconstruction and critique in the Polemical part of the Farbenlehre (FL-
385 PT), choosing the colours blue and red is deceiving.12 Goethe refers to the explanation of
386 the coloured fringes (FL-PT §43, FL-DT §§258–284) before concluding that the
10FL01 10 As an account of objective colours, it equates colour with a property of a theoretical entity outside the
10FL02 observer. A recent attempt developed Locke’s inverted spectrum thought experiment to discuss relations
10FL03 among consciousness, brain, behaviour, and scientific explanation, exploring isomorphism constraints in
10FL04 subjective colour-perception (Palmer 1998).
11FL01 11 In the Opticks I/2, Exp. 5. Newton writes about the separated (‘pure’) spectral colours being further
11FL02 refracted: ‘‘For by this Refraction the Colour of the Light was never changed in the least. If any Part of the
11FL03 red Light was refracted it remained totally of the same red Colour as before…The like Constancy and
11FL04 Immutability I found also in the blue, green, and other Colours’’ (Newton 1952: 122–123). Yellow is
11FL05 suspiciously not listed, as here further fringes are visible.
12FL01 12 Goethe aims to show that the ‘experimental’ proof that Newton uses has superfluous parts (FL-PT
12FL02 §35–39), concluding that the description is endowing Newton’s experiments with purity (FL-PT §41). To
12FL03 talk of -ibilities and -ities (‘‘Ibilita¨ten,… Keiten’’ FL-PT §29) is far-fetched, unsupported, the proposition is
12FL04 not established, but only supported by the experiments. At points Goethe interferes even more with the
12FL05 process of idealisation, claiming that it is invalid.
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387 displacement is an illusion (FL-PT §45). He draws attention to the accompanying illus-
388 tration, where the edges of the displaced image are fuzzy. An obviously elliptic description
389 of the observations is used as proof, and the explanation about the composite nature of the
390 colours is offered by Newton only much later in the text.
391 In Goethe’s experimental series, a rectilinear outline is a better representation of the
392 observations with most colours, recalling Lucas’s critique to mind. It could be debated in
393 the blue/red case, but from carrying out many investigations, it simply shows that the
394 illusion of two displaced rectangles is a powerful one. What is seen is just the two coloured
395 stripes and the usual blue-violet and red-yellow edge phenomena. In the first case the
396 mostly red edge is added to the red stripe on one end, in the second the mostly blue edge is
397 added to the blue stripe on the other end—creating an illusion of displacement.
398 The reception of Goethe’s Farbenlehre shows how the different ways of seeing lived
399 side-by-side, how the two mathematical idealizations, one using an encompassing rect-
400 angle, the other two, displaced rectangles were both empirically confirmed. About the same
401 experiment, criticising Goethe’s treatment of Newton, Thomas Young writes:
402 He gives us, for instance, in his third plate, a number of coloured objects to be
403 viewed through the prism: one of the objects is a space, of which one half is coloured
404 red, and the other blue; and in the representation of the prismatic appearance, the two
405 halves are still placed side by side, and terminated by the same rectilinear outline.
406 This is an ‘experimentum crucis’: we have looked through the prism, at the identical
407 figure of the third plate, and it does not appear as Mr. von Goethe has represented it
408 in the fourth; but the blue image is manifestly more displaced by the effect of
409 refraction, than the red (Young 1814), see also LA II 5A 91-92
410 Young is keen to pick a ‘crucial experiment’, but Goethe’s argument includes not only a
411 critique of the experimental description, but also a critique of the methodology, the very
412 concept of crucial experiments:
413 I venture to assert that one experiment, even several experiments combined, prove
414 nothing; indeed, that nothing can be more dangerous than the attempt to confirm a
415 theory by experiments; and that the greatest errors have arisen precisely because its
416 dangers and its inadequacies were not realized (HA 13:15).
417 Goethe’s polemic (FL-PT §§35–46, also referring to FL-DT §§ 258–284) operates with the
418 notion of the typical, and passes judgment on a single experiment by referring to a series of
419 experiments, a systematic exploration of a set of phenomena. If image displacements (P1–
420 Pn) show regularities (R1–Rn), then it is justified to use diagrammatic convention (C)G.
421 Newton’s example (Pa) is an atypical phenomenon overtly not representing some regularity
422 (Ra), and is used by Newton to justify diagrammatic convention (C)N. Newton, when using
423 dark red and blue, is deliberately choosing Pa, and screening thus Ra (the blue and red
424 fringes), and so Newton’s practice of idealisation is illegitimate, yet he portrays the results
425 of illegitimate idealisation as facts. The legitimate basis of idealisation can be typical
426 phenomena only, and Pa cannot be the basis of idealisation, because it is atypical. As a
427 systematic variation of conditions sufficiently explains why Ra is not overtly manifest in
428 Pa, Pa is a secondary phenomenon, and (C)N is a less apt diagrammatisation.
429 Restricting the enterprise to ‘smaller’ optical theories suggests that Mu¨ller aims to
430 investigate a ‘limited domain’ (p. 349) but the empirical descriptions are intertwined with
431 broader research methodologies and the epistemic values. Mu¨ller’s book-length philo-
432 sophical exercise assumes a two-language game: on the one hand we have sense data
433 (phenomena) and on the other theoretical acts (propositions). A discussion on the language
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434 of descriptions quickly leads to a methodological disagreement on how to interpret the
435 evidence, the experimental setup, and the proof of Newton’s ontological claim. Handling
436 the complexity in a controversy is difficult in a framework with a stable evidence base and
437 provability of ‘theoretical acts’ (‘‘theoretische Tugenden’’ p. 363). The theories in question
438 were born in times of conflict. For either of the theories a number of auxiliary assumptions
439 and different reports of observations were used to provide—supposedly strong enough—
440 support for the position. Mu¨ller’s decontextualised assumptions about theories are fitted for
441 a textbook account of already justified knowledge-parts, but controversial science is a
442 network of disagreements with usually no stable evidence base. In the examined case, often
443 the inspiring ideas behind the theory-development were very different. Some theories were
444 at times more dominant, but for centuries there was hardly ever ‘closure’ or ‘consensus’ in
445 the field.
446 Huygens has already been mentioned, whose study of birefringence was closely con-
447 nected to his non-Newtonian alternative physical optical theory (Dijksterhuis 2004). As
448 Mu¨ller is not mentioning polarisation among the formal properties of light-points and
449 trajectories below I shall discuss the role the anomalous image-producing properties of
450 Icelandic spar played for Goethe. The increasing interest on Huygens’s side in Erasmus
451 Bartholin’s discovery (Lohne 1977) and Newton’s theory stimulated his active interest in
452 developing a theory of light (Shapiro 1973: 240), and Goethe used the singular observa-
453 tions of the atypical phenomenon to link two classes of colours in his Farbenlehre, to
454 extend his explanatory scheme to connect two phenomenal domains.
455 3.3 Linking Classes of Dioptric Colours via Birefringence
456 The Farbenlehre is structured much like a scala naturae, leading from physiological
457 colours (most transient colours), through the increasingly less transient physical colours, to
458 fixed chemical colours. The part on physical colours starts with the chapter on dioptric
459 colours, which appear when light, darkness, and colourless transparent or translucent
460 media interact (FL-DT, §143). The first class of dioptric colours in the didactic part of the
461 Farbenlehre introduces the archetypal phenomenon’s basic polarity, light and shadow.
462 [Grund-und Urpha¨nomen] HA 13: 367, FL-DT §174:
463 On the one hand we see light or a bright object, on the other, darkness or a dark
464 object. Between them we place turbidity and through this mediation colours arise
465 from the opposites; these colours too are opposites, although in their reciprocal
466 relationship they lead directly back to a common unity (Goethe 1988, 12: 195; FL-
467 DT §175).
468
469 The explanatory model developed here is unlike the boundary-modificationist account
470 of Goethe’s Beitra¨ge (the second class of dioptric colours), the earlier prismatic games
471 with coloured fringes extensively untilised by Mu¨ller. The medium serves for enhance-
472 ment, giving rise to the yellow (red) sun—akin to Aristotle’s medium-modificationism
473 proposed in his Meteorologica—and the blue (at night black) sky.
474 The anomalous image-producing properties of Icelandic spar first triggered a tentative
475 idea in an unpublished draft from October 1793: ‘‘Why should the Medium not be able to
476 bring forth a double image through a cause that is unknown to us’’ (LA I, 3: 158). The
477 concept was developed in his later Farbenlehre, where Goethe conjectures about the
478 existence of a double image, and a special subcategory, the ‘‘auxiliary image’’ or
479 Nebenbild, used as a link, to connect the archetypal phenomenon (medium-modification)
480 and the edge-phenomena in prismatic experiments (boundary-modification). The two
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481 classes of dioptric colour phenomena have a unified explanation with the help of an
482 additional concept, the Nebenbild (Zemple´n 2006a).
483 Observations inspired the auxiliary image (a theoretical term?), and with it Goethe
484 linked the earlier research to the new. Edge-colours are subsumed under the archetypal
485 image and this suggests that the theoretical core-elements are transposable (Amrine 1990),
486 and, as polarity and progression survive transformation, the two key elements have the
487 potential to be used recursively, subordinating the earlier explanatory scheme under the
488 more developed one.
489 Mu¨ller’s contribution to the philosophy of experimentation glances over some of the
490 most challenging aspects of Goethe’s science here only alluded to.13 The method
491 manipulating polarities is a lot like a yin-yang theory (building on opposing yet comple-
492 menting primitives) tailored to fit specific phenomenal domains. The polarities relate to the
493 empirical domain and inform the linguistic domain, the archetypal phenomenon displays
494 the essence of polarities, and polarities are essential to the linguistic description. The
495 method establishes a peculiar grammar that informs observation and concept-formation
496 that can travel across domains. Polarity and enhancement are relational concepts that
497 facilitate the empirical work (Zemple´n 2017b), but in Mu¨ller’s voluminous inverted
498 spectrum project only one is used for his replacement-game.
499 3.4 Neurath’s Classification of Optical Theories
500 Otto Neurath—possibly inspired by Goethe—reproduced part of the diagram Goethe also
501 criticised, and hinted at the ‘blurred edges’ of theories (Zemple´n 2006b). Neurath looked at
502 these optical theories because they were significant for the emerging scientific world view,
503 and they were hard nuts to crack, with no shortcuts, like ‘‘Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s
504 system of equations’’. During his work, he analysed some theories in detail, most notably
505 Newton’s Opticks, both with respect to language use, and the use of diagrams. One of the
506 driving forces for Neurath was the recognition that focus only on the abstract and symbolic
507 properties of theories might be unjustified, and other elements of theory-propagation
508 should also be accounted for:
509 Some modern physicists, who, like Poincare´ or Duhem, are reckoned among con-
510 ventionalists, allow that the mathematically important features are relevant to clas-
511 sification and analysis. But this leaves open the philosophical question. Those who
512 wish to give more weight to the imagery of hypotheses (as I believe one must in
513 some cases), may without contradiction add this to the analysis (Neurath 1973:
514 102–103).
515 As we need theories to classify things, Neurath thought that we need theories to classify
516 theories (Neurath 1983: 31), and he attempted to provide an account of optical theories by
517 their employment of ‘elementary notions’, like ‘periodicity’ or ‘emission’. This first step of
518 analysis was followed by the search for the driving (often analogical) ideas, and, to extend
519 the conventionalism of Poincare´ and Duhem, a critical appreciation of how the theory
520 ‘connects’ and ‘selects’ facts.
13FL01 13 The method is also reflexive, it enables Goethe to display his own development as a scientist. For Goethe
13FL02 as a historian of science can use it to develop models for social science: the intertwining polarities (authority
13FL03 and experience) are displayed by Roger Bacon, a typical ‘scientist’ in the irregular Medieval period (atypical
13FL04 for the lack of progress).
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521 His normative historical project was a way to develop tools to overcome epistemically
522 detrimental meaning-polarisation: ‘‘Dichotomies… are not only crude intellectually, but
523 also mostly the product of scientific pugnacity’’ (Neurath 1983: 15). Neurath’s early work
524 on the classification of systems of hypothesis in optics provided many of the key insights of
525 his later philosophy of science (his boat-metaphor and the Neurath-principle are well
526 known). His approach was pluralistic:
527 If one sees that the choice of the original analogy is of no decisive significance for
528 the structure of the system of hypotheses, one is involuntarily impelled to accord
529 equal value to different systems of hypotheses to the degree to which they comprise
530 the multiplicity of reality. Thus it easily becomes a task of patience to succeed in
531 modifying a given system of hypotheses until it achieves the same success as another
532 system. Duhem’s opinion is that, if a sufficiently high prize is offered, one could get
533 a modified emission theory today that would also do justice to those facts of expe-
534 rience which, one believes, can only be explained with the help of a basic supposition
535 that differs from the emission theory. Some people like to dismiss this point of view
536 as a new fashion that was introduced by Poincare´, Duhem and others. In so doing
537 they overlook entirely the fact that the same way of thinking characterised the period
538 a hundred years ago, one that is akin to our period in many ways (Neurath 1983: 28).
539 To develop a theory for the prize using a different’original analogy’ is in my view a very
540 interesting case of underdetermination. In a more mathematicised form it appears in
541 Wigner’s famous ‘The Unreasonableness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences’ paper.
542 As opposed to traditional underdetermination of scientific theory by data (often likened to a
543 curve-fitting problem), Gelfert argues that
544 Wigner’s puzzle raises the spectre of underdetermination of scientific theory by (a
545 multiplicity of conceivable) mathematical frameworks: If we had inherited a dif-
546 ferent set of mathematical concepts or frameworks, our scientific theories of the very
547 same phenomena, though equally successful, might have looked vastly different
548 (Gelfert 2014).
549 The discussed interpretations of the ‘same’ prism-experiments utilised different frame-
550 works, Newton’s physical theory competed first with the (atemporal) geometrical optical
551 tradition and polar (two-colour) modificationist schemes, later with other physical theories
552 (like wave theories in the wake of Huygens), and Goethe’s developmental account of
553 prism-colours. Neurath analysed a set of competing views, and it is easy to understand his
554 plea for a ‘multiplicity of reality’. His analysis also revealed that by data they were not
555 underdetermined, because they differed as to how they select and neglect facts. His social
556 epistemology was informed by the hint that with patience more than one of the alternatives
557 could be improved to the level that the spectre of underdetemrination is raised.
558 About Newton, Neurath noted:
559 It was precisely his inconsistency that was highly stimulating and gave posterity an
560 opportunity to form hypotheses of many kinds, many of which have proved fertile.
561 According to his words he attaches little weight to the character of light, but in fact
562 he is very dependent on the notions that he forms of it. Actually he expresses them
563 several times (Neurath 1983: 20).
564 If Neurath is right about his evaluation (trying at various times to classify the theory), then
565 Newton’s optics is not necessarily the ideal theory to attempt to provide a’strong’ rational
566 reconstruction of. It is very difficult to reconstruct Newton’s position, his New Theory only
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567 provided an idealised sketch of a theory, and, when challenged, he argued that it could be
568 defended. (Laymon 1978). And this sketch could be interpreted various ways. To prove the
569 fruitfulness of his insight, Newton worked for decades on extending the theory to other
570 types of colours, other optical phenomena, to engulf even parts of chemistry. And some
571 argue that it fit Boyle’s chymical project from the start (Newman 2010), so a strong
572 reconstruction of the ‘limited’ domain Mu¨ller tackles should not disregard that the New
573 Theory was also a chemical achievement. It was an eminent example of separation and
574 reintegration by the well-known adept of chymistry, even Lavoisier’s table of elements
575 started with light. To claim that ‘‘we don’t exactly know what Newton’s optical theory
576 was’’, is probably easier to defend than any of the singular (propositional) reconstructions
577 available. For Mu¨ller the task ahead is primarily to pass judgment, to decide on who is right
578 and who is wrong, and not to do a historical study (§I.1.12, p. 38). But one can only pass
579 judgment, when the case is heard and understood.
580 Mu¨ller’s aim is to confront Newton’s Theory with an isomorphous object (p. 431).
581 Given inverted conditions, the isomorphic mapping of the two experimental scenarios is
582 used to develop inverted theories. If his inverted theory is a symmetrical anti-theory of a
583 theory then the two are not that different (logically compatible and empirically equivalent,
584 see Lampert 2017). Mu¨ller’s approach, informed by Quine, ends up with equivalent the-
585 ories that posit unobservables (p. 153), cannot be empirically ruled out, and are admittedly
586 not very plausible given extrinsic criteria (p. 386). They are equally bad (p. 437).
587 Mu¨ller relies on some of the commonly used tools, but I remained unconvinced as to
588 whether the orthodox apparatus without a clearly explicated methodology of reconstruc-
589 tion, like Vicker’s theory-eliminativism (Vickers 2014) can provide a strong interpretation
590 of the controversy or any of the positions. If some of Newton’s inconsistencies had
591 epistemic benefits, then it is questionable that the type of framework Mu¨ller picks is the
592 best for the reconstructive enterprise. How could one find the isomorphous object, the anti-
593 theory, if there is reason to believe that the theory is not a sharply bounded object, it is
594 blurred, vague, or simply fuzzy?14 I would argue that for the philosophy of experimen-
595 tation, Neurath’s treatment offers the richer perspective:
596 We must try to see clearly how a physical theory hinges on the images used, and how
597 far on those features that actually carry the argument. Perhaps we cannot grasp some
598 developments unless we consider the images and pictures; in other uses we must rely
599 on what governs the mathematical treatment of phenomena; or, maybe, both ways of
600 looking at it are steps (Neurath 1973: 102).1
602 4 Conclusion
603 Mu¨ller displays his approach as a further elaboration of one of Goethe’s critical insights
604 into Newton’s optics and claims: prismatic experiments can provide a case for Quine’s
605 underdetermination thesis. Mu¨ller’s book is, perhaps inadvertedly, integrating HPS. This is
606 a thought-provoking game, ending with an appraisal of Goethe’s criticism of Newton’s
607 theory of Light, and re-opening the debate (p. 439). I clearly recognise his early warning
608 that one cannot do rational reconstruction and true-to-details analysis in one book (p. 39).
609 Nonetheless, the philosophical quest runs the risk of modifying the initial views,
14FL01 14 Using fuzzy sets was first developed for legal systems, but scientific controversies have the complexity
14FL02 that their analysis is also supported (Wroblewski 1983; Dascal 2003, pp. 333–335).
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610 simplifying stakes, and distorting positions in attempts to tidy them up. Judgment can only
611 be based on evaluation, but the topic was and still is controversial. In the spirit of the dissoi
612 logoi, I represented a fundamentally different approach, one that does not assume the
613 theories in question to be static or clearly definable entities.
614 I take strong reconstructions to be attempts to provide charitable reconstructions of
615 scientist’s arguments and claims, given any normative framework on evaluation,
616 acknowledging that there can be various analytical stances. Mu¨ller’s local example for
617 underdetermination eliminates a whole lot of the proof-structures it works with (p. 371)
618 and assumes that the theories in question can be reduced to a few sentences pertaining to a
619 restricted domain, optics. Mu¨ller attempts to delimit the problem of underdetermination,
620 but if Neurath’s perspective is more justified, then, as opposed to some other theories, this
621 simplification might not pertain to the optical/colour theories in question. When contexts
622 are simplified to provide strong readings of theoretical content (without full explication),
623 we often fail to see the embeddedness of the ‘theory proper’ in the complex proof structure
624 incorporating evidence, visuals, neologisms and hedgings.
625 My general interest was in studying how a ‘product-oriented’ philosophical recon-
626 structive practice can contain aspects of scientific controversies, ‘processes’, that gradually
627 unfold and that—in this particular case—has lasted over three centuries. For both pro-
628 tagonists of the book, their early publications polarised opinions, their mature works gave
629 rise to opposing camps. Their theories developed, responded to criticisms and incorporated
630 new data. Methodological notions had argumentative functions, and in the multi-party
631 disagreements complex escape trees are more apt ways of displaying the positions than
632 assuming a bounded set of propositions. Looking at the historiography of the controversy,
633 few theories appear less containable than Newton’s and Goethe’s theories of colour.
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